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Introduction 
In 2011, Norway experienced two devastating terrorist attacks that claimed the lives of 77 people. 
For Norway – a small and sparsely populated country – the atrocities proved to be the largest act 
of terrorism in the country’s history (Waggoner, 2015, 186-187). The event, widely referred to in 
Norway as “22 July”, first saw a car bomb detonate outside of the executive government quarter 
of Norway with the result of 8 dead, several seriously injured and causing significant material 
damage. Shortly after, the summer camp of the Labour Party’s youth wing on the island of Utøya 
was attacked by a gunman that massacred 69 people – most them teenagers. The perpetrator of the 
attacks was identified as Anders Behring Breivik, a Norwegian right-wing extremist (Kolås, 
2017:1). Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, speaking at a memorial service two days after the 
attacks, stated the following: “We are still shocked by what has happened, but we will never give 
up our values. Our response is more democracy, more openness, and more humanity.” (The 
Guardian, 2012). Subsequently, the Norwegian increase in security measures following the 
aftermath of the attacks, implemented by Stoltenberg’s Second Government and its successor 
Solberg’s Government, have been modest compared to other examples of European security 
responses. The 2015 Paris attacks, which claimed the lives of 130 people and injured over 300, 
resulted in the French government invoking a state of emergency – granting the authorities the 
ability to exercise a wide range of powers which previously would require judicial authorization 
(Amnesty International, 2016:5-6). The state of emergency in France, intended to be temporarily, 
was later extended to the presidential elections of 2017 (RFI, 2016). Likewise, the London 
bombings in 2005 led the U.K to introduce the 2006 Terrorism Act and the 2008 Counter-
Terrorism Act, resulting in legislative changes and granting more power to U.K security services 
(Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010:112).  
 This paper endeavours to answer the following question: What explains the difference in 
the extent of security measures implemented in Norway compared to France and the U.K. 
following their respective terrorist attacks? What factors can best explain Norway’s security 
response – a response significantly ‘softer’ than its European counterparts? This paper does not 
seek to present Norway as a deviant or unique case that does not securitize. Indeed, Norway did 
experience a substantial increase in security measures in the aftermath of the Breivik attacks, which 
is elaborated upon later in the paper (in ‘Scope and Limitations’). Nevertheless, the Norwegian 
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security response have been mild considering the devastation caused by Breivik. By testing two 
different theoretical frameworks, this paper finds that securitization theory aids in explaining 
differing security responses between Norway and France, yet falls short in its original form in 
explaining the U.K. Additionally, the strength of democratic institutions are found to be an 
explanatory factor in why security responses differ based on the strength of the democracy.  
The paper will proceed as follows: In the following section, I introduce the literature on 
security and securitization, and the responses of democracies to terrorism. The third section will 
contain the theoretical frameworks and arguments that will be used to explain Norway’s security 
response compared to France and the U.K. Next in section four, I introduce the operationalization 
of my arguments, object of study, data and methods, and the scope and limitations of my paper. 
The fifth section will contain empirical analysis through a securitization framework, while the 
sixth section will showcase the empirical analysis from an approach that emphasizes the strength 
of democratic institutions. Lastly, a conclusion will summarize the findings and consider the 
implications of the paper.  
 
Literature review  
Security and securitization theory 
Since the early 1980s, the debate on the conceptions of security have been fierce and contentious. 
Cavelty and Mauer (2010:1-2) pinpoints one of the major debates to the conflict of whether the 
studies of security should be expanded beyond the traditional understanding of the concept related 
to the nation-state, interstate war, and threats of a military nature – a belief rooted in the historically 
dominant international relations approach of Realism. Ullmann (1983) was one of the earlier 
advocates that contested the predominant notion that security was restricted to be understood in 
purely military terms. Ullmann claimed that this view of security expressed a profound distorted 
and false image of reality that was both deceptive and troubling (Ullmann, 1983:129). Ullmann 
therefore set out to redefine security to incorporate threats that derives from other issues such as 
the demand for and scarcity of resources, population growth, and natural disasters. Cavelty and 
Mauer (2010:1) distinguished between two camps in this debate: the “traditionalists vs. wideners-
deepeners”. The traditionalists, as evident by the name, believed that there was no need to expand 
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the study of security beyond the traditional understanding of the concept. In contrast, the 
“wideners” believed that the changing security landscape warranted the addition of other risks to 
the board: economic, societal, political, and environmental issues. Furthermore, the “deepeners” 
thought it necessary to not only widen the conception of security, but also deepen the 
understanding of the concept by adding more levels of referent objects: international systems, 
international subsystems, units, subunits, and individuals (Cavelty and Mauer, 2010:1-2). The 
deviation from the traditional approach of security studies thus unlocked a broader agenda of 
security studies, which would be referred to as critical approaches to security (Peoples and 
Vaughan-Williams, 2010:5).  
 The field of critical approaches to security have primarily been focused around three 
schools of thought: The Aberystwyth School, Copenhagen School, and the Paris School. While 
the Aberystwyth and Copenhagen schools was largely entrenched in the international relations 
field of international security, strategic studies and peace studies, the Paris School drew from 
interdisciplinary approaches including political theory, sociology and criminology (C.A.S.E. 
Collective, 2006:446-449). The concept of “securitization” originated at the Copenhagen School 
and was derived from the combination of the theoretical work on different sectors of security by 
Barry Buzan (1991) and Ole Wæver’s conceptualization of securitization (1995). Briefly 
summarized, securitization refers to when an issue is taken from being nonpoliticized or politicized 
to being securitized – thus being moved to the realm of emergency politics by presenting it as an 
existential threat (Peoples and Vaughan-Williams, 2010:75-77). Wæver (1995:54-55) argues that 
this makes security a speech act: “By uttering ‘security’, a state-representative moves a particular 
development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are 
necessary to block it”. The purpose of a successful speech act is to convince the audience to accept 
violations or limitations on established norms and rules (Heller, Kahl, Pisoiu, 2012:289).  
 Considerable criticism of the concept of securitization as a speech act has come from the 
Paris School. Bigo (2000:194-195) views Wæver’s analysis as restricting the mechanisms of 
securitization to enunciation and discourse exclusively – consequently omitting semiotic non-
linguistic factors such as gestures and symbols. Moreover, he argues that the mere knowledge of 
how to enunciate a security statement is not enough to securitize: The social position of the speaker 
and the recognised legitimacy that the individual has from other social actors determine its success. 
5	
	
Thus, Bigo argues, the process of securitization will never occur absent of groups and institutions 
that are accredited with deciding what security entails (Bigo, 200:195). Balzacq (2005), another 
affiliate of the Paris School, similarly contests the predominant focus of the concept is on the 
discursive element of the speech act. Instead, he argues that securitization would be better 
understood as a strategic practice in which its success depends on the context of the act, the 
dispositions of the audience (psychologically and culturally) and the participants power (Balzacq, 
2005:172). A complementary stance is shared by McDonald (2008:573, as quoted in Heller, Kahl, 
Pisoui, 2012:292) who argues that “those interested in the construction of security must pay 
attention to the social, political and historical contexts in which particular discourses of security 
(even those defined narrowly in terms of the designation and articulation of the threat) become 
possible”. Thus, for a securitization act to be successful, actors must be mindful of the cultural 
contexts and environments that influences the outcome (Heller, Kahl, Pisoui, 2012:292).  
The views of the Paris School on the overly emphasis of the discourse component of the 
speech act is shared by Huysmans (2011), yet he fixates on the ‘act’ itself. According to Huysmans 
(2011:2-5), it is the ‘act’ itself – being the decision to create the securitizing move and subsequent 
consequences by the speaker– that carries the political investment of the speech act rather than the 
speech. However, Huysman (2011:6-9) further acknowledges that this stance encounters 
complications when regarding securitization from a more sociological and processual approach – 
thus to an extent invalidating the importance of the Copenhagen School’s securitization theory. 
This approach views securitization as the result of ongoing processes that increase security through 
practices and the diffusion of technology, e.g. surveillance oriented such as CCTV cameras, that 
influence and affect everyday life. These continuous processes, which Huysman refers to as “little 
security nothings”, gradually blur the line between normality and the exceptional. Therefore, the 
importance of the decision-making speech act is reduced to being only one of many small 
components that contribute to the ongoing securitization. Neal (2009:351-353) concurs with this 
line of thought in his criticism of securitization theory. The abovementioned processes and 
practices are not dependent on emergency and exceptions to occur, but rather through relations 
between differing fields of policy, technology and security professionals. Accordingly, 
securitization ensues through processes occurring internally and between different bureaucratic 
agencies rather than through the politicians uttering the speech act. This paper will apply 
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theoretical insight from the securitization theory and the contribution of its critics to examine 
whether this impacted the Norwegian security response after the 22 of July.  
 
The response of democracies to terrorism 
The problem of how liberal democracies can respond to terrorism while maintaining their 
democratic legitimacy and character have been greatly discussed by scholars. Wilkinson 
(1986:125, as quoted in Pedahzur and Ranstorp, 2001:1-2) was one of the earliest who articulated 
this problem: “The primary objective of counter-terrorist strategy must be the protection and 
maintenance of liberal democracy and the rule of law. It cannot be sufficiently stressed that this 
aim overrides in importance even the objective of eliminating terrorism and political violence as 
such”. This was further reiterated by Chalk (1998:386-388) who proclaimed that adhering the 
constitutional principles of law and order was a requirement for any liberal democratic response 
to terrorism. Additionally, he stated that a liberal democracy’s response should comply to three 
overarching principles: the response needs to be limited, credible, and accountable. Despite the 
view of such scholars, Tsoukala (2006:608) points out that most liberal democratic governments 
surmise that it is a necessity to cede some of its democratic nature to effectively fight terrorism. 
Thus, implementation of illiberal counter-terrorism policies and measures are justified by 
government officials to protect the security of citizens through effectively combatting the terrorist 
threat. Even so, Matthew and Shambaugh (2005:231) proposes that while democracies may 
infringe on their democratic values in short periods after an attack or incident, they also have 
inherent democratic characteristics in the forms of processes and mechanisms - e.g. transparency 
and accountability - that will prevent long term subversion of a state’s democratic nature. In 
contrast, Neal (2012:273-274) contests the assumption that everything will return to as it used to 
be when sufficient time has passed since the emergency. Rather, legislative security changes 
introduced during the time of exception is prone to undergo normalization and thus, both in small 
incremental steps and making temporary laws lasting ones, which once was exceptional will 
become ordinary. Acts of normalization of such legislations are often undertaken by new 
governments that both wish to distance themselves from the previous regime and implement their 
own, lasting legislative changes.  
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Liberal democracies do not always respond similarly to acts of terrorism. Crelinsten and 
Schmid (1992:315, as quoted in Sederberg, 1995:299) states that it’s the perception of the problem 
of terrorism that dictates the nature of response: If the state views terrorism as an act of war, it will 
pursue repressive methods to deal with the issue and if the state views terrorism as a crime, it will 
pursue solutions of a judicial nature. Traditionally, there have been three prominent models in the 
literature that categorizes the counter-terrorism strategies of states – the reconciliatory model, the 
criminal justice model, and the warfare model. The reconciliatory model addresses terrorism as a 
political problem, and the goal is to address the root causes of these problems, through for example 
political reform, and thus remove the terrorist threat. The criminal justice model treats terrorism 
as a crime with the goal being to penalize terrorists while complying to the rule of law. The last 
model of warfare treats terrorism as an act of war and thus uses military means to eliminate the 
terrorist threat (Perliger, 2012:493-494).   
 Perliger (2012:494-498) criticizes the abovementioned models as insufficient due to a 
combination of the model neglecting certain factors and its low resolution. Instead, she proposes 
a model of a two-dimensional space that draws on two vectors, the legal vector and the operational 
vector, to situate a state’s response to terrorism. Additionally, Perliger (2012:526-527) finds that 
the nature of a state’s democracy decides on its security response to terrorism: Weaker democracies 
are more likely to respond forcefully, while strong democracies are more likely to utilize 
reconciliatory measures and avoid the use of hard-line acts – conclusion reached by Fimreite et. 
al. as well (Fimreite, Lango, Lærgreid, Rykkja, 2013:852). Yet, it is not a given that strong 
democracies will avoid maximizing their legal and operational powers to combat terrorism under 
certain conditions. The possibility of this occurring is when the “struggle against terrorism takes 
place in a separatist context, in socially and geographically peripheral regions, and when the 
violence is exercised by groups representing the interests of ethnic minorities” (Perliger, 
2012:527). This paper applies the theoretical framework and findings mentioned by Perliger above 
to examine whether this affected Norway’s security response after the Breivik-attacks.    
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Theoretical frameworks and arguments 
Securitization  
The first of the theoretical frameworks that will be applied to this papers empirical analysis is 
securitization. Peoples and Vaughan-Williams (2010:83) states that one of the contributions of 
securitization theory was that it emphasized how security is not necessarily an innately positive 
concept. Securitizing issues and events leads to emergency politics that set aside otherwise 
necessary policymaking mechanisms like deliberation, participation and bargaining due to 
restricted time and space, and thus a militarized mode of thinking takes their place. In the context 
of this paper, securitization will not be referencing how actors securitize issues that have 
previously been outside of the realm of security. Terrorist attacks are inherently security issues 
since they directly pose an existential threat to a referent object – people – and as some would 
argue – to the state itself. Instead of looking at how issues are securitized, this paper will primarily 
utilize the speech act component of securitization to see whether the speech act was utilized by 
actors referencing to the attacks as justification for the implementation and usage of exceptional 
measures. Additionally, the theoretical framework introduced here will draw on the Paris School’s 
criticism and contribution to securitization theory; namely that the social, political, historical and 
cultural context surrounding the interaction between speaker and audience impacts the success 
chances of the speech act. Taking these considerations into account, the paper arrives at its 
argument to explain the difference in security responses in Norway compared to the U.K and 
France: 
Norway did not implement security measures equal to those of France and the U.K since 
securitization attempts either never took place or were impeded by Norway’s socio-
political culture.  
 
Strength of democratic institutions and the rule of law 
The second theoretical framework that will be applied in this paper is that of the strength of 
democratic institutions and the rule of law. This concept is constructed upon the literature of how 
democracies responds to terrorism, and Perliger’s (2012) findings on how strong democracies are 
less likely to indulge in the use of hard-line measures in addressing terrorism. In additional to what 
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was introduced in the literature review, Perliger (2012:489-499) finds two major contributing 
factors that influence the reaction to terrorism in democratic countries: “(1) the level of 
institutionalization of democratic foundations; and (2) the features of terrorism, and the way they 
impact threat perception regarding the danger for the stability of the socio-political order”.  An 
assessment of the strength of the rule of law will be guided by Belton’s (2005:3) characterizations 
of the rule of law: “First, as ends-based definitions make clear, the rule of law is not a single, 
unified good but it is composed of five separate, socially desirable goods, or ends: (1) a government 
bound by law, (2) equality before the law, (3) law and order, (4) predictable and efficient rulings, 
and (5) human rights.” With this theoretical framework in mind, the paper arrives at the following 
alternative argument to explain the difference in security responses in Norway compared to the 
U.K and France: 
Norway securitized less than France and the U.K due its strong democratic characteristics 
and adherence of the Rule of Law. 	
 
Operationalization of concepts 
Securitization 
When operationalizing the concept of this papers main argument, it is necessary to reiterate that 
securitization is a speech act. Thus, any attempt at securitization needs to include uttering the 
words security as a component when calling for more security responses. Another necessary 
requirement of the operationalization of securitization is that the actors showcase the potential for 
more terrorist attacks as an existential threat to the referent object – i.e. the people of the nation 
and the nation itself. Therefore, the measurement of securitization per the utilized 
operationalization will apply to any attempt made by state-actors to call for security in the 
aftermath of terrorist attacks by referring to the existential threat that they face. Empirical 
observations of this concept will primarily be looked at either in Parliament debates, in which 
either participant of the interaction may assume the role of speaker, or in the public domain in 
which a state-actor acts as the speaker with the public being the audience.  
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Strength of democratic institutions and the rule of law 
The operationalization of the concept in my alternative argument draws on the previously 
introduced characteristics of the rule of law by Belton (2005:3) and Perliger’s (2012:498) proposed 
spatial model on the scope of democratic responses to terrorism. The main point, ‘a government 
bound by law’, will be measured on whether the government adheres to the established judicial 
system or invokes a state of exception in which emergency powers can be utilized. On Perliger’s 
(2012:498) model, this can range from “no specific or general legislation against terrorism” to 
“state of emergency, special emergency legislation; use of military courts” along the Legal Vector, 
and “no use or very limited use of any type of violent or law keeping forces/Negotiations/Political 
reform” to “full use of military forces and covert organizations” along the Operational Vector. 
‘Human rights’ will be measured by whether the government actively infringes upon civil liberties 
and human rights when addressing issues of terrorism. Measurement of the strength of democratic 
institutions and the rule of law will utilize empirical observations found in primary documents and 
secondary sources. 	
 
Case Selection 
The objects of study in this paper was chosen, slightly influenced by the logic of Most Similar 
Systems Design, due to a set of shared traits, yet different outcomes: (1) The three countries are 
all European. This is the result of the assumption that these countries are thus more similar in terms 
of history, culture and socio-political systems in contrast to what would be the case if the study 
consisted of more different cases e.g. Norway, the U.S and Russia. (2) The three countries all 
experienced devastating terrorist attacks of somewhat comparable magnitude: the lives of more 
than 50 people were lost in all cases. (3) All the countries are active participants in the “War on 
Terror”. However, the cases differ in one major regard concerning the terrorist attacks committed: 
France and the U.K experienced attacks carried out by Jihadist perpetrators, while the Breivik 
attacks in Norway were the product of a right-wing extremist. While this goes against the 
characteristics of Most Similar Systems Design, it nevertheless provides an interesting 
comparative angle. Furthermore, the study could have expanded upon the cases selected, following 
the similar selection pattern, by including for example Belgium, yet too many inclusions would 
weaken and reduce the overall empirical analysis by making it less specific.  
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Data and Methods 
Data generation and analysis 
The study will mainly utilize primary sources as to generate data. These sources will be NOU 
reports (Official Norwegian Reports), including the 22. July Commission Report, and U.K 
Terrorism Acts. Additionally, transcripts of speeches and addresses by Norwegian, British and 
French state-officials will be analysed. Furthermore, parliamentary debates in Norway and the U.K 
will be utilized to determine if there were calls for security measures or successful/attempted 
securitization speech acts.1 	
The data analysis of this paper will follow the framework of sociological analysis and thus 
utilize its three levels: The textual level, contextual level and interpretive level (Ruiz, 2009:3). The 
paper will first through textual analysis define the discourse – since the discourse itself is the object 
of study. Yet, as Ruiz (2009:4) states, this does not mean that the discourse is objective – what 
constitutes as important and relevant in the discourse is interpreted by the analyzer. This type of 
analysis will be often utilized in this paper due to its reliance on primary sources, in addition to 
parliamentary debates being transcribed as to allow for textual analysis. The others level of 
sociological analysis, contextual and interpretive, will allow the paper to provide an understanding 
of how the discourse is framed and explanations for the emergence of the discourse (Ruiz, 2009:3).  
 
Scope and Limitations 
This paper is inevitably restricted by time and space, and thus aims to answer the research question 
by utilizing two specific frameworks. Naturally, there are other frameworks that could have been 
utilized as well to derive other explanations, yet the paper had to restrict the number of concepts 
utilized as to allow for more in-depth analysis. This is a significant limitation of the paper as it 
only provides a specific set of explanations to a question that requires the combination of many 
more to answer satisfactory. It may be the case that the largest explanatory factor for the differing 
security responses is omitted from this paper – e.g. that of the nature of the perpetrators. 
Additionally, the findings of the paper are not intended to be generalizable – the results are 
																																								 																				
1 Linguistic difficulties prohibit this for French Parliamentary Sessions	
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dependent on the context of the cases and the interpretation of the author in these specific cases. 
The paper also suffers from a language barrier regarding the French language, and is therefore 
unable to analyse and utilize French documents and sources.  
 What arguably constitutes as the main limitation of the study, or at least what could become 
the main point of critique, is the subjective interpretation of how much Norway securitized in the 
aftermath of the attacks. Some may argue that Norway’s security response shared too many 
similarities with France and the U.K for it to be considered substantially different. Indeed, such 
criticism is valid. Norway was amongst the European countries which introduced new counter-
terror laws and increased security measures following 9/11 (Fimreite, Lango, Lærgreid, Rykkja, 
2013:840). Additionally, Norway did experience a substantial increase in security measures in the 
aftermath of the Breivik attacks: In 2013, legislative changes criminalized the planning and 
preparation of terrorist activities, and criminalized the recipient of terror training (Stortinget, 
2013).  Furthermore, the Norwegian Police Security Service (PST) was allocated more resources 
and legislative changes enabled the Norwegian military to assist the police if needed (Regjeringen, 
2017). Despite this, the paper would still characterize the Norwegian response as one markedly 
different from the security responses in France and the U.K following their respective terrorist 
attacks.  
Differing Security Responses: Securitization 
The main argument proposed in this section is that the different security responses in the U.K, 
France and Norway can be explained by the lack of securitization attempts in Norway following 
the 2011 Breivik attacks. Per securitization theory as developed by Buzan and Wæver, 
securitization speech acts serve as one of the main causes of implementation of security and 
exceptional measures, and thus a difference in securitization attempts and their successes 
between the countries would explain the differing responses.  
 
Securitization and Exceptional Measures: The U.K  
The implementation of counter-terrorist policies, measures and the invocation of a state of 
emergency is not a recent occurrence in EU countries, yet the introduction of legislation that 
infringes on civil rights and the increase of power for security agencies has been increased after 
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the onset of the War on Terror – France and the U.K included (Tsoukala, 2006:607-608). 
Historically, the conflict in Northern Ireland has generated a substantial amount of antiterrorist 
legislation in the UK which supplied the possibility for exceptional measures during exceptional 
periods (Tsoukala, 2006:609). It is unsurprising thus, given its experience with terrorism, that 
U.K government officials are preoccupied with security. Indeed, following the terrorist attack in 
the U.S, the then Home Secretary stated the following after encountering opposition in passing 
an emergency anti-terrorism legislation – and thus committed a securitizing speech at by 
referring to an existential threat and uttering the words “secure ourselves” – which projected a 
message to the audience that the security of the people was dependent on the legislation passing 
(The Independent, 2001): 
 God willing there won’t be an attack on us over Christmas and New Year, because all those who tell me we  
 are not [under threat] are the ones who do not have the security and intelligence information which for my  
 sins I carry… That information tells us that because of our alliance – quite rightly – with the United States  
 and because of our vulnerability we are at risk. And it is on those grounds we act to secure ourselves. 	
Even so, following the 2005 London bombings, there was an absence of a forceful, securitizing 
speech-act by Prime Minister Tony Blair in both his addresses to the public and to the House of 
Commons (BBC, 2005; The Guardian, 2005). In his address to the public, Blair stated that “We 
must be clear about how we win this struggle. We should take what security measures we can.” 
(BBC, 2005). However, excluding this small mention of the importance of increased security 
measures, Blair’s statement was void of any attempts at securitization and mentions of the need 
of exceptional measures. Following Huymans thoughts on the speech act as earlier referenced, 
the ‘act’ itself never occurred – that being the decision to utilize the opportunity for a securitizing 
move. The Prime Minister’s address to the House of Commons, although omitting any mention 
of security directly, resembled more of a securitizing speech act. Blair reiterated the need for a 
counter-terrorism bill, which was already in the making (Terrorism Act 2006a), and emphasized 
that if security agencies required additional powers to prevent further attacks it should be 
granted. The Terrorism Act 2006 was later passed – one of the consequences being that the 
maximum period of detaining suspects believed to be affiliated with terrorism was changed from 
14 to 28 days (Terrorism Act 2006b:23).  
 There is then the issue of further anti-terrorist legislation . . . It will give us an opportunity, in close  
 consultation with the police and the agencies, to see whether there are additional powers which they might  
 need to prevent further attacks . . . If, as the fuller picture about these incidents emerges and the  
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 investigation proceeds, it becomes clear that there are powers which the police and the intelligence  
 agencies need immediately to combat terrorism, it is plainly sensible to reserve the right to return to  
 Parliament with an accelerated timetable (The Guardian, 2005). 	
Following the London bombings, U.K has implemented several legislative changes that grants 
security agencies exceptional measures. Particularly, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures Act, introduced in 2012, is prominent in this regard: Faced with individuals that the 
state is unable to prove are affiliated with terrorist activities, the state may still invoke measures 
for a two-year duration on the individual – which may include electronic tagging, required 
regular reporting to the police, barred from travelling abroad, and being prohibited from specific 
locations (Lister, 2015:5-6). As Home Secretary Theresa May stated in a parliamentary debate 
concerning the TPIMs: “They provide some of the strongest restrictions available in the 
democratic world and some of the strongest possible protections that our courts will allow. 
(Parliament Publications, 2014: Column 229). Yet, in contrast to what the paper may have 
expected, there have been no distinct securitizing speech act moves in the U.K following the 
terrorist attack of 2005. This supports the arguments made by Huysman and Neal in that the 
decision-making speech act is reduced in importance regarding securitization, and the 
explanatory factors should be accredited to processes and practices that increase security – i.e. 
the diffusion of surveillance technology and interactions between different fields of policy and 
security agencies. Thus, the paper infers that the increase in security measures undertaken by the 
U.K following the 2005 London bombings is the result of securitization through processes and 
practices rather than through speech acts. Yet, this argument can be refuted. The absence of one 
explanatory factor does not automatically make another right – it isn’t necessarily one or the 
other. Additionally, the research of the paper has its limitations and may have missed attempted 
or successful securitizing speech acts committed by prominent members of government.  
 
Securitization and Exceptional Measures: France 
As with the U.K case, France have had its own share of experiences related to terrorism. During 
the 1980s and early 1990s, France was considered by some to be a “haven for international 
terrorists” due to its lacking capacity in combating terrorism, yet the late 90s saw drastic 
improvements on this front after conducting several successful counterterrorist operations – 
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amongst them prevention of planned terrorist attacks against the World Cup in 1998 and against 
the Strasbourg cathedral in 2000 (Shapiro and Suzan, 2003:68-69). One of the main French 
counterterrorism legislations, Law 86-1020 of September 9, 1986, resulted in the creation of new 
governmental bodies dedicated to handling terrorist elements – UCLAT and SCLAT – in 
addition to centralizing all judicial affairs regarding terrorism (Shapiro and Suzan, 2003:76-77). 
In recent years, France declared a state of emergency following the Paris attacks in 2015 – one 
which has been prolonged several times and is still in full effect. The state of emergency has 
allowed for exceptional measures to be undertaken by security agencies: Searches without 
warrants, house arrests, prohibiting meetings being amongst these (Boutin and Paulussen, 
2016:1). Additionally, legislative measures such as a new counterterrorism law was passed, Law 
2016-731 of June 3, 2016, further augmenting the powers of security agencies in terms of 
surveillance, searches and arrests (Boutin and Paulussen, 2016:3).  
 In stark contrast to the case of the U.K, France have experienced prominent securitizing 
speech acts moves in the aftermath of the attacks in 2015. In a speech before a joint session of 
Parliament, President Francis Hollande committed a securitizing move through a speech act by 
declaring the necessity and urgency for several security responses and measures (France 
Diplomatie, 2015). Additionally, he repeatedly states that it is necessary for the protection and 
safety of citizens, thus referencing to the existential threat to the people of France. The 
securitizing move made by Hollande intended to remove all barriers against emergency politics 
and his speech implies that a forceful response is prioritized rather than upholding democratic 
values. The findings of this subsection support the original securitization theory and thus the 
paper finds it plausible that a major explanatory factor for France’s intense security response 
following the Paris bombings is the speech act by Hollande. The following are noteworthy 
excerpts from his speech (France Diplomatie, 2015): 
 France is at war. . . It is therefore urgent for us to defend ourselves, on a long-term basis. What’s at stake is  
 the protection of our fellow citizens and our ability to live together . . . I ordered the immediate  
 reestablishment of border controls and I proclaimed a state of emergency, as recommended by the Prime 
 Minister. It is now effective throughout France, and I expanded the ability to carry out police searches in  
 every department of continental France . . . In accordance with these principles, we will provide the means  
 to once again guarantee the safety of our fellow citizens . . . And since the threat is going to continue and  
 we will be involved in the fight against Daesh for a long time abroad and at home, I also decided to  
 substantially strengthen the resources available to the justice system and the security forces. 	
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The scarcity of Norwegian securitizing speech acts  
Compared to its two European counterparts, Norway’s experience with terrorism pre-2011 has 
been extremely limited. Minor incidents have taken place, and it was first in 2012 that someone 
was incarcerated for planning acts of terrorism. While Norway participated in the War on Terror 
and introduced counterterrorism legislature in the aftermath of 9/11, the changes were more 
modest than those of other countries (Fimreite, Lango, Lærgreid, Rykkja, 2013:841-843). 
Despite this, Norway saw an increase in security measures following the Breivik attacks of 
2011.2 However, similarly to the U.K, there was a notable absent of any securitizing speech acts 
by governmental officials following the attacks. Instead of calling for more security or 
emphasizing the need to defend against an existential threat, Norwegian state officials followed a 
pattern of focusing on solidarity and unity - as evident by Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg’s 
speech two days following the attacks where “more democracy” was the primary message. (The 
Guardian, 2012). Indeed, only miniscule portions of the post-2011 addresses to the public 
included any mention of security measures. During a national commemoration speech, a month 
after the attack, Stoltenberg stated that “Our third mission is to create safety. Good 
readiness/preparedness creates safety. Visible police create safety.” (Regjeringen, 2011).3 At a 
commemoration speech three years later, the new Prime Minister Erna Solberg proclaimed that 
“The tragedy showed us that it is necessary to strengthen the readiness/preparedness in Norway. 
Better intelligence, more police and a stronger readiness/preparedness culture is crucial to 
prevent and limit our weakness.” (Regjeringen, 2014). These two are the only discursive 
elements post-2011by prominent Norwegian officials that have stated the need for more security 
measures. However, they do not fulfill the criteria of a securitizing move: They do not reference 
to an existential threat, invoke the need for exceptional measures nor does neither utter the word 
“security”. 	
 Equivalently, there have been few calls for the introduction of emergency politics and 
drastic security measures. Yet, some have been made. The Minister of Justice and Public 
																																								 																				
2	This	is	covered	under	the	section	of	«Scope	and	Limitations»	
3	This	speech	and	subsequent	quoted	portions	in	this	subsection	have	been	translated	from	Norwegian	to	English	
by	the	author	of	this	paper	and	may	thus	be	found	unsatisfactory	by	someone	fluent	in	both	languages,	yet	it	will	
suffice	for	the	purpose	of	this	paper.		
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Security Grete Faremo stated the following during a Parliamentary debate on March 8, 2012 
(Stortinget, 2012:[11:19:22]): “It is crucial for our security that we have a service which is 
prepared to carry out its societal assignments in a good way. An external and impartial review 
will give us answer if the situation regarding resources and competence in PST is satisfactory – 
especially from a preventive perspective, as the Parliament requests.” This was one of the few 
instances where security was uttered as something essential and needed. Additionally, The 
Official Norwegian Reports, namely the 22. July Commission Report, was void of any definite 
calls for substantial increases in security measures as well – it namely called for a legislative 
change that would make receiving terrorist training a punishable offence and that increased 
effectiveness in coordination between different security agencies was a necessity to prevent 
similar atrocities happening in the future (NOU, 2012:458-460). The lack of securitization 
attempts might be explained by Norway’s socio-political culture: Norwegians in general have a 
great deal of trust in the government and in political institutions. Additionally, even post-2011, 
few Norwegians expressed fear concerning potential future terrorist acts or even perceived it as a 
threat (Fimreite, Lango, Lærgreid, Rykkja, 2013:848-849; Waggoner, 2015:198).	
 The contributions to securitization theory by Balzacq and McDonald, as previously 
referenced, illustrates why these factors may have deterred securitization efforts. Balzacq and 
McDonald emphasized that the cultural, historical and psychological context surrounding the 
audience of a speech act was crucial in determining the outcome. This paper would argue that 
securitization efforts through speech acts never occurred in Norway since the context 
surrounding the audience, that being the people, would severely diminish the success chances of 
potential acts. Norway’s lack of historical experience with terrorism would likely make the 
population less inclined towards accepting drastic security measures despite the large-scale 
attack. Additionally, Norwegians trust in government and institutions, which implies 
transparency and openness, would probably be incompatible with hard-line security measures for 
the people. Lastly, the psychological factor is arguably the most important. Securitizing moves 
through speech acts are completely dependent on the audience possessing a fearful mindset – 
how can state officials convince the audience to accept exceptional measures to combat an 
existential threat if the audience does not even perceive the threat to begin with? These findings 
lend support to the main argument of this paper: Norway did not implement security measures 
equal to those of France and the U.K since securitization attempts either never took place or were 
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impeded by Norway’s socio-political culture. However, similarly to the U.K case, the weakness 
of this argument is that the paper’s research might be limited in terms of scope and thus may 
have overlooked conflicting data. 	
 	
Differing Security Responses: Strength of Democratic Institutions and the Rule of Law	
The alternative argument proposed in this section is that the different security responses in the 
U.K, France and Norway can be explained by the strength of the country’s democratic 
institutions and its adherence of the rule of law. Utilizing findings by Perliger, it is assumed that 
states that have strong democratic institutions and adherence of the rule of law are less likely to 
use hard-line measures to combat terrorism, and vice versa.  
 
Disparity in adherence of democratic institutions and the rule of law 
The empirical discussion of the previous section has informed adequately enough that one can 
pinpoint France, the U.K and Norway to the traditional models that explain the responding 
strategies of democracies to terrorism. Unsurprisingly France have adopted the warfare model by 
its treatment of terrorism as an act of war – as evident by the previously referenced Hollande’s 
speech. France has also adopted the most distinctive repressive measures due to its 
implementation of the state of exception, infringing on civil liberties in the process, and thus by 
extension not completely adhering to democratic norms and the rule of law due to its earlier 
introduced definition which labels “human rights” as a component of the rule of law. 
Furthermore, the Freedom House Index report of 2017 gave France an aggregate score of 90 in 
which 100 indicates the maximum level of freedom. While in isolation it impressive and 
indicates that France almost fully adheres to its democratic institutions, it is still lower than the 
U. K’s and Norway’s scores which were 95 and 100 respectively (Freedom House Index, 
2017:21-24). Additionally, the state of emergency indicates that France does not have a 
government that is bound by law. The nature of the state of emergency is that it allows for 
exceptional measures – measures that bypass entrenched judicial and legal frameworks. The state 
of emergency is designated for short periods of time only, yet it has been in effect since 2015 and 
thus gradually some of the exceptional measures implemented might become normalized. 
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Finally, France can be situated at both extreme ends of Perliger’s operational and legislative 
vectors. If one were to categorize France as a weak democracy – at least weaker than previously 
- Perliger would find support for her argument that weaker democracies are more likely to use 
hard-line measures, and vice versa.  
 The paper would argue that the U.K have adopted the criminal justice model in 
combating terrorism both prior and post the 2005 London bombings. The objective of the U.K 
have been to penalize individuals affiliated with terrorism, yet within legal boundaries as 
illustrated by the quote of There May in the previous section. While the TPIMs and the 
prolonged detention from Terrorism Act 2006 are examples of security measures that infringe 
upon the civil liberties of individuals, it is still within the framework of the law and thus can’t be 
considered as exceptional measures. The U. K’s aggregated score on the Freedom House Index is 
higher than France, and its security response is less hard-lined – thus again supporting Perliger’s 
argument. Both Fimreite et. al. (2013:851) and Waggoner (2015:200) both claim that Norway 
adopted the reconciliatory model following 2011 – albeit Waggoner is less explicit than Fimreite 
et. al. in her conclusion. However, following the definition of the reconciliatory model 
previously used, this paper would argue that Norway adopts strategies from both the criminal 
justice and the reconciliatory model. Indeed, the trial of Breivik have been applauded as “an 
example of a performance of justice and as a trial that focused on the democratic values of 
Norwegian society – contrary to Breivik’s values.” (Graaf, Heide, Wanmaker and Weggemans, 
2013:16). While Norway has in the aftermath of the attacks introduced legislation that focuses on 
penalizing terrorist affiliated individuals, it has been relatively limited similarly to other types of 
security measures taken. Norway is arguably the best case for Perliger’s argument that strong 
democracies avoid hard-line measures given its Freedom House Index score of a 100 in addition 
to meeting all the criteria for adherence of the rule of law. These findings lend support to the 
alternative argument of this paper: Norway securitized less than France and the U.K due to its 
strong democratic characteristics and adherence of the rule of law. Nevertheless, the argument 
loses strength due to limitations on its specificity and the lack of supporting evidence to 
decisively infer that it is the strength of the democratic institutions that limits the severity of 
security measures implemented. Lastly, similarly to the papers main argument, the strength of 
Norway’s democratic institutions might serve as a correct explanatory factor, yet its significance 
might be miniscule compared to other factors with greater explanatory power.   
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Conclusion 
 This paper has endeavoured to utilize two different theoretical frameworks to determine why 
Norway’s security response following the large-scale terrorist attack of 2011 was relatively 
modest compared to its European counterparts the U.K and France. The main theoretical 
framework was that of securitization and the speech act as developed by the Copenhagen School 
in combination with latter contributions from the Pars School and other scholars. This framework 
was utilized to test empirical data, mostly state-official addresses, to determine if speech acts 
could be an important explanatory factor in explaining the differing security responses amongst 
the three European countries. Surprisingly, the U.K showed little signs of securitization through 
speech acts even though a substantial amount of security measures were implemented prior to 
and following the 2005 London bombings, thus granting more support to sociological theory that 
explains securitization through constant processes and practices. On the other hand, France had 
explicit speech acts which arguably played a major role in the securitization of France after the 
Paris attacks of 2015. Lastly, the papers argument is strengthened by the lack of securitization 
speech act attempts in Norway following the 2011 Breivik attacks – attempts which were likely 
deterred due to a combination of historical, cultural and psychological factors. In conclusion, the 
securitization framework succeeds in explaining the stark contrast between Norway and France, 
but has its limitations when including the U.K in the equation. 	
 The alternative theoretical framework utilized was that of the strength of democratic 
institutions and the rule of law. The empirical findings of the paper reflect the arguments posed 
by Perliger on how democracies respond to terrorism – strong democracies avoid the use of hard-
line measures and weak democracies are more prone to use repressive methods in combating 
terrorism. Thus, in conclusion, the alternative argument offered is supported by the empirical 
findings, yet its limitations make it inferior to the main argument in terms of explanatory power. 
Finally, one must be wary when deriving policy implications from this paper. Due to its 
interpretive nature, the paper’s findings are not designed to be generalizable. The interpretation 
of the author and the exclusion of several factors that could have influenced the result makes it 
ill-advised to blindly project the findings and style of this paper and apply it somewhere else – 
despite how similar the cases may seem. However, the paper does highlight and further reinforce 
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theories such as Perliger’s and it showcases that while securitization through speech acts may 
function as decisive contributors in states securitising, it also suggests it’s not applicable 
everywhere.  
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